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I. Introduction

Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
charter schools.1 As of 2010, there were nearly 5,000 charter schools
educating around 1.5 million students.2 Charter schools are established
through a “performance contract detailing the school’s mission, program,
goals, students served, methods of assessment, and ways to measure
success.”3 Charter schools usually receive a contract of three to five years.4
At the end of the contract, a charter authorizer may renew the contract
based on the school’s ability to meet the requirements set in the contract.5
In exchange for this accountability, charter schools receive waivers
exempting them from a number of restrictions that apply to traditional
public schools.6
Charter schools are becoming increasingly popular to students of
color, especially African-American students.7 According to a 2010 survey
conducted by Harvard’s Program on Educational Policy Governance and
the journal, Education Next, 64% of African-Americans support charter
1. See THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES
(2012),
http://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2012) (noting that the states without charter schools are Alabama, Kentucky,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and West
Virginia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
2. See GARY MIRON ET AL., SCHOOLS WITHOUT DIVERSITY: EDUCATION
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRATIFICATION
OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 1 (2010), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/
publication/schools-without-diversity (explaining the rapid growth of charter schools over
the past two decades) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
3. U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Charter Schools: An Overview and History of Charter
Schools, USINFO.ORG, http://usinfo.org/enus/education/overview/charter_ schools_
history.html (last visited April 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
4. See id. (“The length of time for which charters are granted varies, but most are
granted for 3–5 years.”).
5. See id. (providing an overview of the charter renewal process).
6. PRESTON C. GREEN & JULIE F. MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE LAW:
ESTABLISHING NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 5–6 (2004) (stating that charter schools are
relieved from certain regulations in exchange for achieving certain educational outcomes).
7. Paul E. Peterson & Martin West, African-Americans for Charter Schools, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487042718045
75405121906353464.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (“Support for charters among African
Americans rose to 49% in 2009, up from 42% in 2008. [In 2010] it leapt upward to no less
than 64%.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
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schools while 14% of African-Americans were opposed.8 Scholars have
also asserted that charter schools may more effectively meet the need of
African-American and Latino students than traditional public schools.9
They have emphasized the charter schools’ ability to adopt educational
themes that specifically address the educational needs of students of color, a
small school size, and the flexibility in hiring teachers as reasons for such
optimism.10
Critics have countered that charter schools may not be an effective
alternative for students of color because they are even more segregated than
traditional public schools.11 The percentage of black charter school students
in 90–100% minority schools12 is nearly twice as high as is the case for
black traditional public school students (70% compared to 36%).13 Also,
43% of black charter school students attended schools in which 99% or
more of the enrollment were students of color.14 Although segregation is
not as extreme for Latino students in charter schools, 50% of these students
also attend 90–100% minority charter schools, compared to 38% of Latino
traditional public school students.15 These statistics are disconcerting
because schools with high percentages of racial minorities are more likely
than predominantly white schools to have problems with teacher turnover.16
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New
Course, 106 YALE L. J. 2375, 2404 (1997) (noting the potential advantages charter schools
provide for parental involvement and local control); see Preston C. Green III, Preventing
School Desegregation Decrees from Becoming Barriers to Charter School Innovation, 144
EDUC. L. REP. 15, 23 (2000) (suggesting that charter schools may “reduce racial isolation in
inner-city school districts”).
10. See Green, supra note 6, at 19 (explaining why many African-Americans support
the charter school movement as a way to address their specific needs).
11. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL
SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 1 (2010), available at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choicewithout-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (“The charter
effort, which has largely ignored the segregation issue, has been justified by claims about
superior educational performance, which simply are not sustained by the research.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
12. Id. at 41. Ninety-three percent of charter or traditional public schools where 90%
of students are black and Latino are also schools in which a majority of students are lowincome. Id. at 72–73.
13. Id. at 38 (comparing the percentage of charter and public school students in
segregated minority schools by race).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Brief of 533 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
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Schools with high concentrations of minority students also tend to have
lower educational outcomes, as quantified by test scores, high school
graduation rates, and college graduation rates.17
A recent federal appellate court decision suggests that students of
color should also be concerned about the legal protections that charter
schools might provide to students.18 Because state authorizing statutes
consistently define charter schools as “public schools,”19 it would appear
that charter school students are entitled to constitutional protections.20
Students attending public schools have challenged deprivations of federal
constitutional and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
establishes a cause of action for deprivations of federal constitutional and
statutory rights “under the color of state law.”21 Students have sought
10, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003)
(Nos. 05-908 & 05-915) (explaining that teachers are more likely to leave predominantly
minority schools, resulting in higher teacher turnover).
17. See id. (noting the correlation between teacher retention and educational
outcomes).
18. See Caviness v. Horizon Learning Center, 590 F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that the constitutional protections afforded under the state-action doctrine did
not extend to a charter school in Arizona that had been subsidized and regulated by the
state).
19. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15−181 (2011) (“Charter schools are public schools
that serve as alternatives to traditional public schools . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33
(2011) (“All charter schools in Florida are public schools.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4J
(2011) (“A charter school shall be a nonsectarian, nonreligious and non-home-based public
school.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-503.5(a) (2011) (stating that charter schools are
“considered to be public schools within the state’s public education system”). Additionally,
Maryland and Washington, D.C., refer to charter schools as “public charter schools.” See
MD. EDUC. CODE § 9-102 (2011); DC STAT. § 38-1802.01 (2011). Also, the U.S. Charter
Schools website, which is supported by the National Alliance of Public Charter Schools,
defines charter schools as “nonsectarian public schools of choice that operate with freedom
from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools.” See U.S. Dept. of
State, supra note 3.
20. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.”). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“[S]tudents do not shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
21. Title 42, Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011).
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damage awards pursuant to § 1983; “actions for injunctive or declaratory
relief are [also] a major portion of the case law.”22 However, in 2010, the
Ninth Circuit concluded in Caviness v. Horizon Learning Center23 that a
private, nonprofit corporation running an Arizona charter school was not a
state actor under § 1983.24 The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the
assertion that charter schools were state actors because they were defined as
“public schools” under the state statute.25
This Article examines the dangers that the Caviness case may pose for
students of color who are attending charter schools. The second section
provides an overview of § 1983 and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,26 the Supreme
Court case that examined the statute’s applicability to private schools. The
third section discusses how courts prior to the Caviness decision have
addressed the question of whether charter schools are state actors under
§ 1983. The fourth section discusses the Caviness case. The final section
explores the legal implications that Caviness may have for the legal rights
of students of color who attend charter schools.
II. The State Action Doctrine, Private Schools, and Rendell-Baker
In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court first examined the applicability
of § 1983 to private schools. This case involved a Massachusetts private
school that served maladjusted students.27 Almost all of the students had
been referred to the school by city school committees or by a state agency.28
22. Mark C. Weber, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding, and the Future of Section 1983 Education Litigation, 252
EDUC. L. REP. 8, 10 (2010).
23. See Caviness, 590 F.3d at 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the allegations were
“insufficient to raise a reasonable inference” that the private corporation running a charter
school was a state actor).
24. See id. at 808 (stating that neither the corporation nor its director was proceeding
as a state actor with regard to employment actions taken against a former teacher).
25. See id. at 815 (stating that plaintiff’s “reliance on Arizona’s statutory
characterization of charter schools as ‘public schools’ does not itself avail him in the
employment context”).
26. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 831 (1982) (finding that a private
school for maladjusted students was not a state actor).
27. See id. at 832 (explaining that the school is a private institution for students with
drug, alcohol, or behavior problems who have difficulty completing public high schools).
28. See id. (noting that most students had been referred by the Brookline or Boston
School Committees or by the Drug Rehabilitation Division of the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health).
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Public funds had accounted for at least 90 percent of the school’s budget.29
To be eligible for tuition provided by a state statute, the school had to
follow a number of regulations “concerning matters ranging from
recordkeeping to student-teacher ratios.”30 With regard to personnel
matters, the state statute required the state “to maintain written job
descriptions and written statements describing personnel standards and
procedures,” but imposed few specific obligations.31 The school had a
contract with the Boston School Committee, which stated that the school’s
employees were not city employees.32 The school also had a contract with
the state’s drug rehabilitation division.33 Except for general requirements,
that contract did not cover personnel policies.34
A vocational counselor and teachers brought separate § 1983
challenges alleging that the school had fired them in violation of the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.35 The First Circuit consolidated the
actions and dismissed the claims.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and found that the private school was not a state actor.37 According to the
Court, “[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to
suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights fairly
29. See id. (“In recent years, public funds have accounted for at least 90%, and in one
year 99%, of respondent school’s operating budget.”).
30. Id. at 833.
31. Id.
32. See id. (stating that the Boston School Committee referred to the school as a
“contractor” and specified that school employees were not city employees).
33. See id.
34. See id. (“Except for general requirements, such as an equal employment
opportunity requirement, the agreement does not cover personnel policies.”).
35. See id. at 834–35 (stating that Rendell-Baker (the vocational counselor) brought
suit in July 1977, followed by five teachers in December 1978, all alleging that their First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated). See US CONST. amend. IV
(“The right of the people . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”); U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (“No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
36. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (providing an overview of the
procedural history of the case).
37. See id. at 837 (affirming the First Circuit’s decision that the private school was not
a state actor).
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attributable to the state?”38 The Court answered this question in the
negative; it found that the school’s relationship with the state “is not
fundamentally different from many private corporations whose business
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dames, ships, or
submarines for the government.”39 Such agreements did not become state
action “by reason of their significant or even total engagement in
performing public contracts.”40 The Court also reasoned that the
relationship between the school and the teacher did not change because the
state paid the tuition of the students.41
Further, the Court found that the state regulations did not make the
private school a state actor.42 “[I]n contrast to the extensive regulation of
the school generally,” the Court asserted that “the various regulators
showed relatively little interest in the school’s personnel matters.”43 The
Court rejected the argument that the school was a state actor because it
performed the public function of providing education.44 To qualify as a
state action, the function would have to be the “exclusive prerogative of
state.”45 The legislature’s decision to provide services to maladjusted
students at the public’s expense “in no way makes these services the
exclusive province of the State.”46 Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that the fiscal relationship between the school and the state
created a “symbiotic relationship,” thus making the school a state actor.47
This was the case because the school’s fiscal relationship was similar to that
of many contractors performing governmental services.48
38. Id. at 838 (internal quotation omitted).
39. Id. at 840–41.
40. Id. at 841.
41. Id. (analogizing the school to a public defender who, though paid by the state, had
a relationship with her client like that of any other attorney and client).
42. See id. (explaining that the school’s decision to discharge the petitioners was
unrelated to state regulations).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 842 (stating that the relevant question goes beyond whether a private
group is serving a public function).
45. See id. (discussing what private activities receive constitutional protections under
the state action doctrine’s public function exception) (emphasis in the original).
46. Id. (reasoning that government programs to aid maladjusted students do not make
those programs the exclusive province of the state qualifying for the public function
exception to the state action doctrine).
47. See id. (reasoning that providing the school with government aid did not transform
the private school into a tool for state action).
48. See id. at 843 (explaining that the funding provided to the school was similar to
many contractual relationships the government shares with private actors which are not
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III. Charter Schools and § 1983 prior to the Caviness Case

In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court held that a private school was
not a state actor under § 1983 for the purposes of employment issues for
four reasons.49 First, the contractual relationship with the state was similar
to other contracts between private corporations and state governments.50
Second, the state employment regulations were not extensive.51 Third,
providing special education services to students was not the exclusive
province of the state.52 Fourth, the fiscal relationship between the school
and the state was similar to other contracts for public services.53
The hybrid nature of charter schools raises the question of whether
charter schools are state actors under § 1983 or private entities that are
merely providing a public service. Prior to the Caviness case, federal courts
in Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have examined the question
of whether charter schools were state actors under § 1983. All of these
courts concluded in the affirmative. This section provides an overview of
those cases.
A. Ohio
In 2002, an Ohio federal district court first addressed the question of
whether charter schools and the private companies that operated these
schools were state actors. In this case, Riester v. Riverside Community
School,54 a terminated teacher sued the charter school and the management
companies that provided services for that school under § 1983. She alleged
that the charter school and the management companies violated her First

transformed into state actors).
49. See id. at 841–42 (holding that a private school was not a state actor because the
contractual, regulatory, and fiscal relationship, plus the services provided by the school, did
not indicate the school was a state actor).
50. See id. at 841 (reasoning that the contract with the school resembled contracts
between the government and other private corporations not deemed state actors via the
contractual relationship).
51. See id. (reasoning the state regulation over the private school was insufficient to
make the school a state actor).
52. See id. at 842 (reasoning that because the state was not the sole provider of special
education services, the fact that the school offered such services did not make the school a
state actor).
53. See id. (reasoning that because the contract with the school resembled other
contracts for public services, the contract did not make the school a state actor).
54. Riester v. Riverside Cmty. Sch., 257 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
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Amendment rights by terminating her in retaliation for her complaints
pertaining to the lack of services for a troubled student.55
The charter school and the management companies then moved to
dismiss the claim on the ground that the charter school and management
companies were not state actors under § 1983.56 The court denied the
motion.57 It found that the state charter school law defined charter schools
as public schools.58 It thus followed that the charter school, and by
extension the management companies, were state actors.59 The court further
found that management companies were state actors under the public
function and entwinement tests—two tests used to determine whether
private companies are state actors.60
Under the public function test, a private company is a state actor when
it provides a traditional state function.61 The court found that the
management companies were state actors because “free, public education,
whether provided by public or private educators, is an historical, exclusive,
and traditional state function.”62 The court rejected the defendant’s
assertion that Rendell-Baker required a different conclusion because: (1) the
charter school was created “only with the help of the state,” and (2) the
charter school “is subject to various rules and regulations to which private
schools are not.”63
The court also agreed that the management companies were state
actors under the entwinement test, which states that private conduct may
become so “entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
55. See id. at 969 (providing the facts which led to allegations of retaliation against a
teacher by Riverside Community School).
56. See id. at 970 (stating that Riverside filed a motion to dismiss because the school
was not a state actor).
57. See id. (denying Riverside’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff pled a proper
retaliation claim).
58. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.01 (West 2011) (declaring that community
schools formed in Ohio are public schools and part of the state education system).
59. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (reasoning that Ohio statutes and precedent deem
charter schools to be public schools, and as such are state actors).
60. See id. (discussing the entanglements and public function exceptions to the state
action doctrine).
61. See id. (discussing the requirements of the public function doctrine).
62. See id. (holding that the management companies satisfied the public function test
because schooling was traditionally the exclusive province of the state).
63. See id. at 972−73 (holding that Riverside Community School satisfied the public
function doctrine).
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limitations of state actors.”64 The court concluded that the private
companies were state actors under the entwinement test because “they have
been granted the authority to provide free public education to all students in
a nondiscriminatory manner; no other entity . . . has been so mandated by
the State of Ohio besides local school districts.”65
B. Pennsylvania
In 2003, a federal district court in Pennsylvania found that charter
schools were state actors under § 1983. In Irene B. v. Philadelphia
Academy Charter School,66 parents of a student attending a charter school
filed a § 1983 action alleging that a charter school violated the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).67 The child, who was attending a
Philadelphia public school, was a “15-year old boy with Down Syndrome,
mental retardation, and profound hearing loss in his right ear.”68 His mother
contacted the founder and principal of the charter school, who told the
mother that it could meet his educational needs and would develop a new
Individual Educational Plan (IEP) for the child that would incorporate life
skills and academics.69 When the child enrolled as an eighth-grader in the
school, his parents provided the school with his IEP, which was developed
by the Philadelphia School District.70 The parents asserted that other than
speech therapy and bus transportation, the charter school failed to provide
the services promised to their child under his prior IEP.71 Also, the parents
claimed that the charter school failed to develop a new IEP as it had
promised.72
64. See id. at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that the management
companies satisfied the entwinement exception to the state action doctrine).
65. See id. (holding that the management companies also qualify for the public
function exception because the state allows no other entity besides those companies aside
from school districts to provide public education).
66. Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., No. Civ.A. 02–1716, 2003 WL 24052009,
*1, (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003).
67. See id. at *1 (alleging that Philadelphia Charter Academy School violated the
IDEA by not developing programs to meet the needs of students with learning disabilities).
68. Id. at *2.
69. See id. (explaining that the school assured the student’s mother before his
enrollment that the school could accommodate his learning disability).
70. See id. (recounting the events prior to the dispute, including providing the school
with the disabled student's IEP).
71. See id. (explaining that the school failed to provide the services it promised to
provide the disabled child under a IEP).
72. See id. (explaining that the school failed to develop a new IEP for the disabled
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The parents then sued in district court alleging a violation of IDEA.73
The court rejected the charter school’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.74 The court found that the
§ 1983 claim could proceed because “[i]t is now well-settled that a
municipal entity is a state actor for purposes of liability under § 1983.”75
Public school districts were municipal entities.76 Similarly, the court noted
that because charter schools were independent public schools, they were
part of the school system.77 Thus, it was appropriate to treat charter schools
as state actors with respect to IDEA claims.78
C. New York
In 2006 and 2007, two New York federal district courts also concluded
that charter schools were state actors under § 1983. In the 2006 decision,
Matwijko v. Board of Trustees of Global Concepts of Charter School,79 a
former teacher alleged that the principal and the board of a charter school
terminated her, in violation of the First Amendment,80 because of her
actions as chairperson of the school’s advisory council.81 The defendants
moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the defendants
were not state actors pursuant to § 1983.82
student as it promised the parents it would).
73. See id. at *1 (explaining the claims for violations of the IDEA filed by the
student’s parents against the school).
74. See id. (detailing the various claims which the court is dismissing and which are
sufficient to state a claim).
75. Id. at *11.
76. See id. (explaining that the Philadelphia school district system is a municipal
entity).
77. See id. (explaining that because the charter school was a public school, it was part
of the public school system and thus a municipal entity acting under color of law for the
purposes of the state action doctrine).
78. See id. (explaining that because the charter school acted under the color of law as
part of a municipal entity, the plaintiffs may state a claim under the IDEA).
79. Matwijko v. Bd. of Trs. of Global Concepts Charter Sch., No. 04-CV-663A, 2006
WL 2466868 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”).
81. Matwijko, No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868, at *1 (explaining that the
plaintiff filed a complaint for retaliatory firing in response to her criticisms of the defendant's
allegedly unlawful practices).
82. See id. (explaining that the defendants moved to dismiss the claims by asserting
the state action doctrine did not apply).
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The court denied the defendants’ motion on the ground that the New
York charter school statute provides that charter schools are independent
and autonomous public schools performing essential public purposes and
governmental purposes of the state.83 The court also noted that charter
schools had “to meet the same health and safety, civil rights, and student
assessment requirements applicable to other public schools.”84
Additionally, charter schools received 100% of the per-pupil funding
provided to other public schools, and any public student was qualified for
admission to a charter school.85 Further, the school code permitted charter
school employees to participate in the public retirement system and
afforded these employees protection under New York’s civil service law.86
Therefore, the fact that the code did not consider charter schools otherwise
as public employers “did not remove them from the realm of state actors.”87
The court concluded that the legislature intended charter schools to be
public schools despite the fact that they were exempted “from certain
regulatory burdens associated with traditional public schools.”88 The court
found that Rendell-Baker was inapplicable because New York law did not
consider charter schools to be private schools.89
In Scaggs v. New York State Department of Education,90 students
attending a charter school brought a § 1983 action against a charter school
and Edison Schools (“Edison”), the private entity that operated the school.91
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Americans with

83. Id. at *5 (emphasis in the original).
84. Id. (emphasis in the original).
85. See id. at *3 (explaining that charter school students receive the same funding on a
per-student basis as other public schools, and that public school students were eligible to
attend the charter school).
86. See id. at *4 (explaining that employees of the charter school receive the same
legal protections and retirement entitlements as public school employees).
87. See id. at *5 (concluding that, although the state code did not consider charter
schools public schools, it did not preclude the possibility and that circumstances support a
finding that the charter school was a state actor).
88. See id. (concluding that the charter school was a public school despite a laxer
regulatory burden than most public schools have).
89. See id. (distinguishing Rendell-Kohn by indicating that New York law does not
consider charter schools to be private schools).
90. See Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep’t of Educ., No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221, *24
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part).
91. See id. at *2 (detailing the procedural history behind the case, including the initial
complaint filed against defendant claiming their right to a free education was violated by the
defendants).
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Disabilities Act,92 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,93 and the Equal
Protection Clause.94 The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the
ground that Edison was not a state actor.95 The district court contrasted the
instant case to Rendell-Baker. Because Rendell-Baker was an employment
action regarding a single teacher; the state was “only minimally or
tangentially involved.”96 Conversely, the plaintiffs’ allegations in the
instant case “relate[d] to the alleged total inadequacy of a school to provide
free public education to its students while receiving state funding, being
bound by educational standards and purporting to offer the same
educational services and facilities as any other public school.”97 Because
the plaintiffs’ claims challenged the quality of education provided by
charter schools, the court held their § 1983 claim may proceed.98
D. Illinois
In 2009, several months prior to the Caviness decision, a federal
district court in Illinois held that a not-for-profit organization that owned a
charter school was a state actor pursuant to § 1983.99 In this case, Jordan v.
Northern Kane Educational Corp., the not-for-profit organization
(“NKEC”) relieved an employee of her duties as executive director of the
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”).
94. See Scaggs, No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221 at *3 (detailing the various
claims filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant). See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
95. See Scaggs, No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221 at *3 (discussing the motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Edison did not qualify as a state actor).
96. See id. at *13 (distinguishing Rendell-Baker because that case involved
employment action against a single teacher and only minimally involved the state).
97. See id. (distinguishing Rendell-Baker because this case involved the provision of
facilities and services related to public education, which bears more directly on state action
than the employment action in Rendell-Baker).
98. See id. (holding that the claim may be brought against Edison because it provides
public education services).
99. See Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744, *3 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
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charter school and made her a full-time teacher.100 NKEC later terminated
her employment as a teacher.101 The former employee then filed a
complaint under § 1983, alleging that NKEC violated her due process rights
by failing to provide a hearing before firing her.102 NKEC moved to dismiss
the claim on the ground that it was not a state actor under § 1983.103
The district court denied NKEC’s motion to dismiss.104 The court
observed that although Illinois’s charter school law did provide that charter
schools were public entities, it failed to address explicitly whether the entity
that owned the charter school was a public entity.105 However, the charter
school law did provide that “governing bod[ies] of charter school[s] [were]
subject to the same disclosure requirements that applied to other [state]
governmental entities.”106 Therefore, it was apparent that the legislature
intended charter school bodies to function as public entities.107
Consequently, the court concluded that NKEC was a state actor pursuant to
§ 1983.108
E. The Caviness Case
Prior to the Caviness case, federal district courts consistently found
that charter schools, their governing boards, and the private companies that
either provide services or run these schools were state actors pursuant to
§ 1983.109 The courts in New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania ruled in this
fashion because the state charter school laws defined charter schools either
as public schools or municipal entities. An Illinois district court held that a
private entity operating a charter school was a state actor because charter
school governing boards were subject to the same disclosure requirements
as other state governmental bodies.110 By contrast, in Caviness, the Ninth
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id. at *2.
106. Id. at *3.
107. See id. (“It therefore appears that the Illinois legislature . . . intended that the
governing body of a charter school function as a public, government entity.”).
108. Id.
109. See supra section III (discussing cases decided prior to the Caviness case).
110. See Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (ruling that a charter school should be treated as a government entity).
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Circuit held that a private, non-profit corporation that operated an Arizona
charter high school was not a state actor in § 1983.111 This section provides
an overview of the Caviness case.
1. Background
In February 2006, a female student accused Michael Caviness, a
physical education teacher and track coach working at the charter school, of
crossing student-teacher boundaries.112 The private entity running the
charter school (“Horizon”) placed Caviness on paid leave and then
investigated the student’s claims.113 The Horizon board held a hearing in
which it—but not the teacher—questioned the student.114 The board
concluded that Caviness had exercised questionable judgment with regards
to his interactions with the student and decided not to renew his teaching
and coaching contract.115 The board decided to keep Caviness on paid leave
until the end of his contract in June 2006.116
In April 2006, the executive director of Horizon wrote a letter to
Caviness that he also sent to the Arizona Department of Education.117
Caviness claimed that the letter made several false and defamatory claims
about him.118 In July 2006, Caviness applied for a position as a teacher and
a coach in another Arizona school district. The district refused to hire
Caviness after the executive director of Horizon declined the school
district’s request to rate his ability and knowledge as a teacher.119
In August 2006, Caviness’s attorney sent a letter to Horizon claiming
that a Horizon employee had called him a pedophile.120 The letter
demanded that Horizon provide written evidence that it had instructed all of
its agents and employees to refrain making such claims.121 The executive
director did not address this demand in his written response; Caviness
111. See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding that a charter high school was not a state actor).
112. Id. at 810.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 811.
121. Id.
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asserted that another Horizon teacher subsequently falsely called him a
pedophile.122
In December 2006, Caviness requested a name-clearing hearing to
address Horizon’s conduct following the March 2006 hearing.123 Horizon
did not answer this request.124
2. District Court Decision
In March 2007, Caviness filed a complaint under § 1983 in the United
States District Court of Arizona.125 Caviness claimed that Horizon, acting
under the color of state law, deprived him of his liberty interest in “finding
and obtaining work without due process by making ‘several false
statements about’ him ‘in connection with his employment’” without
providing him notice or a name-clearing hearing.126 The district court
granted Horizon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).127 It
rejected Caviness’s claim that Horizon was a state actor because of the
enabling statute’s characterization of it as a “public school.”128 The district
court also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the school was a state actor
because it performed the public function of education.129
3. Circuit Court Decision
Caviness then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.130 The court affirmed the
district court’s motion to dismiss with respect to the § 1983 claim.131 The
Ninth Circuit observed that it would find that Horizon was a state actor “if,
though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the
challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as
that of the state itself.”132 To determine whether there was a close nexus, the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
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court’s inquiry began by examining the specific conduct at issue because an
entity may be a state actor for some matters but not others.133 The Ninth
Circuit then found that Caviness failed to argue that Horizon’s specific
conduct rendered it a state actor.134 Instead, Caviness asserted that Horizon
was a state actor as a matter of law under the state’s charter school
scheme.135 “Therefore,” the court reasoned, “Caviness’s appeal must fail
unless being an Arizona charter school, is by that fact alone, sufficient to
make Horizon the government for employment purposes.”136
The court rejected Caviness’s first argument that charter schools were
state actors for all purposes, including employment matters, under the
state’s statutory and regulatory scheme.137 In support of his assertion,
Caviness observed that Arizona statutes defined charter schools as “public
schools” and that the state attorney general had concluded that charter
schools were political subdivisions under the state open meeting act.138 The
court disagreed with this argument because a private entity may be a state
actor for some purposes but not others.139
Caviness also argued that Horizon was a state actor because it
provided public education, which Caviness characterized as a “function that
is ‘traditionally and exclusively under the prerogative of the state.’”140 The
Ninth Circuit countered that Rendell-Baker foreclosed this argument.141 The
Ninth Circuit found that the instant case was like Rendell-Baker in that the
Arizona statute authorized the charter school sponsor to provide alternative
educational choices at public expense.142 As in Rendell-Baker, such a

133. Id. at 812–13.
134. Id. at 813.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 813–14.
139. Id. at 814. Caviness also cited a Sixth Circuit case, Greater Heights Acad. v.
Zelman, 522 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2008), which found that charter schools were state actors
under § 1983 because they were political subdivisions under Ohio law. Caviness, 590 F.3d
at 814. The Ninth Circuit found that Greater Heights Academy was irrelevant because it says
nothing about Arizona’s charter school law. Id.
140. Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010).
141. See id. at 815 (countering that the legislative policy choice of allowing private
organizations to run charter schools did not make education the exclusive province of the
state).
142. See id. (discussing the similarities between Caviness and Rendell-Baker).
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legislative choice did not place these services under the exclusive power of
the state.143
Third, Caviness claimed that Horizon was a state actor because the
state regulated personnel issues related to charter schools.144 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this assertion, noting that state action may occur if the state
had exercised coercive power over the private entity.145 On the other hand,
subjecting a business to mere regulation did not convert the private entity
into a state actor.146 Even extensive regulations did not make a private
entity a state actor if the regulations did not compel the private entity’s
challenged conduct.147 The court found that the charter school statute did
not control Horizon’s post-termination decisions.148 Indeed, the statute
expressly exempted Horizon from all rules relating to school districts,
including providing employees the right to a hearing after dismissal.149 The
Ninth Circuit found further support for its conclusion because of the
absence of any reference to charter schools in the statutory provisions
related to certified teachers’ employment rights.150 Additionally, the court
found that the fact that charter schools could participate in the state’s
retirement system did not make Horizon a state actor.151 It was settled case
law that states could subsidize the operating costs of a private entity
“without converting its acts into those of the state.”152 Moreover, the Ninth
143. See id. (explaining the court’s reasoning that even substantial state involvement in
the charter school did not rise to the level necessary for it to be a state actor).
144. See id. at 816 (presenting Caviness’ argument for Horizon being a state actor).
145. See id. (“A state may be responsible for a private entity’s actions if it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982))).
146. See id. (stating that general state regulation is insufficient to make a business a
state actor).
147. See id. (“Even extensive government regulation of a private business is insufficient
to make that business a state actor if the challenged conduct is was not ‘compelled or even
influenced by any state regulation.’” (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982))).
148. See id. at 817 (analyzing the Arizona Revised Statues, to conclude that Horizon
was not bound by any state regulation in its post-termination proceedings).
149. See id. (“Horizon is expressly ‘exempt from all statutes and rules relating to
schools, governing boards and school districts.’” (citing Arizona Revised Statutes § 15187(A), (B))).
150. See id. at 816 (“The absence of any reference to charter schools in the statutory
sections governing certified teachers’ employment rights supports our conclusion.”).
151. See id. (providing that a state’s subsidization of a private business does not convert
that business into a state actor).
152. Id. at 817.
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Circuit rejected the fact that Horizon became a state actor because its
sponsor had the power to approve and review its charter school, including
its personnel policies.153 Mere approval of the actions of private entities did
not convert their personnel decisions into state action.154 This was the case
even when the state had the initial power to review the qualifications of the
schools’ employees.155
IV. The Implications of the Caviness Case for Students of Color
Although the Caviness case was an employment case, it is important to
recognize that a similar analysis could lead to the conclusion that charter
schools are not state actors with respect to student constitutional issues.
Students attending public schools are guaranteed constitutional
protections.156 There are constitutional safeguards for student expression.157
Public school students are protected from unreasonable search and
seizure.158 The Constitution also requires public schools to provide
procedural due process safeguards when suspending or expelling
153. See id. (explaining that reviewability of personnel decisions does not rise to the
level of state actions).
154. See id. (stating that acquiescence or approval by the state did not make private
entities into state actors).
155. See id. (“Even when the state has the power ‘initially to review the qualifications
of a[n employee] selected by the school,’ such regulation is not sufficient to make the
school’s employment-related actions those of the state.” (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 838 (1982))).
156. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.”).
157. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988) (“[Students] cannot be
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises-whether ‘in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,’ (citing
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13(1969))); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407–09 (2007) (elaborating on the safeguards in place for student
expression at schools).
158. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (“Rather, the legality of a
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of
the search.”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“As the text
of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
government search is ‘reasonableness.’”) The Court goes further to state that “special needs”
exist in the public school context, which means that the warrant requirement would interfere
with swift disciplinary procedures. Id. at 653; Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Potttawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (examining the protections students
are afforded from unreasonable search and seizures).
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students.159 Of the seven states in the Ninth Circuit with legislation
authorizing charter schools,160 only Oregon guarantees that all federal rights
apply to charter schools.161 With the exception of Oregon, state legislatures
do not compel charter schools to follow constitutional guidelines with
respect to due process. California and Idaho merely require potential charter
school operators to disclose their disciplinary policies in their initial charter
application.162 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nevada do not even demand
that charter schools disclose their disciplinary policies at the time of
application.163
In Goss v. Lopez,164 the Supreme Court held that students subject to
suspensions of ten or fewer days were entitled to due process.165 A student
facing such a suspension had a right to “be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the
story.”166 The Goss Court also observed that “[l]onger suspensions or
159. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (discussing the property and liberty
interests public school students have in receiving a fair hearing before being suspended or
expelled).
160. Montana and Washington have no legislation authorizing the operation of charter
schools. See Rev. Code Wash. § 28A.208.010 (demonstrating that a Washington state
referendum blocked the charter school provisions from becoming law).
161. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 338.115(1)(a) (2011) (explicitly stating that Federal law
applies to public charter schools). Arizona’s charter school law limits its protection of
students to the First Amendment. See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-110 (2011) (detailing
Arizona’s protections of students’ religious viewpoint and expression).
162. See Calif. Educ. Code § 47605 (2011) (explicating the process of forming a charter
school in California); see also Idaho Stat. § 33-5205 (2011) (detailing Idaho’s process for
the formation of a charter school).
163. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii and Nevada provide the minimum requirements for an
application to form a charter school in each respective state. The statutes, in general, discuss
educational quality, employment, facility selection, and governance. None of the statutes
explicitly require that charter schools during the charter application process disclose their
proposed disciplinary policies and how those policies will protect the rights of students. See
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 14.03.255, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-183(a), Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 302(b)5, 302(b)-6, and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 386.520(4). Both Alaska and Nevada explicitly grant their
respective boards of education power to prescribe additional charter application
requirements. This grant of power does not, however, guarantee that the administrative
agencies will create the additional requirement of disclosing disciplinary policies and
practices. See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.03.280 and Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.520(4).
164. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
165. See id. (“Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property
and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
166. Id. at 584.
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expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures.”167 Circuit courts that have determined the
due process requirements in situations involving long-term suspensions and
expulsions have employed the balancing test of the Supreme Court’s
Matthews v. Eldridge168 to determine whether additional due process was
required.169 Matthews requires the Court to balance three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.170

If constitutional due process does not govern the charter schoolstudent relationship, then it is quite possible that a court will find that
contract law applies, as in the case of private schools.171 Courts are very
reluctant to intervene in the suspension and expulsion decisions of private
schools.172 If a private school “has clearly stated the rule, preferably in
writing, and a parent chooses to have his or her child attend the school, a
court will generally uphold the rule.”173 In Flint v. Augustine High
School,174 for example, a Louisiana private school expelled two students for
violating its no smoking policy.175 The school’s handbook called for a fine
167. Id.
168. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
169. See Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923–24 (6th Cir. 1988)
(“Without the aid of Supreme Court authority directly on point, we are left with resolving
the procedural due process issues presented in this appeal under the more general rubric of
Matthews v. Eldridge.”); Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989)
(applying the test established in Matthews v. Eldridge); Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel,
242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (showing how different courts have utilized the
Matthews test in analyzing potential due process violations in educational settings).
170. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
171. See David Pollack & David Schnall, Expelling and Suspending Students: An
American and Jewish Legal Perspective, 9 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 334, 343 (2003)
(“Private schools, regardless of whether they include religious teachings, are governed by a
contract between the parent and the school.”).
172. See id. (demonstrating the courts reticence to engage in overturning private school
suspensions and expulsions).
173. Mary A. Shaughnessy, Civil Law and Catholic Education: Past, Present, and
Future, 12 Catholic Educ: A J. of Inquiry & Practice, 519, 527 (2003).
174. Flint v. St. Augustine High School, 323 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 1975).
175. See id. at 230–31 (showing that the school had a specific policy against smoking,
of which students were made aware in the student handbook).
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of ten dollars for the first offense, and expulsion for the second offense.176
The state court of appeals upheld the suspension of the students.177 In
reaching its decision, the court declared that private institutions “have a
near absolute right and power to control their own internal disciplinary
procedure which, by its very nature, includes the right and power to dismiss
students.”178 Although the court allowed that due process protections could
not “be cavalierly ignored or disregarded," it held that "if there is color of
due process—that is enough.”179
Students of color attending charter schools should be concerned about
the potential lack of constitutional due process protection. Studies of data at
the national, state, district, and building levels have consistently found that
students of color are suspended at two to three times the rate of other
students.180 African-American students should be especially concerned
about the possible lack of due process protection.181 According to the U.S.
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, in the 1970s AfricanAmericans were two times more likely than white students to be suspended
from school.182 By 2002, the risk of suspension for African-Americans
increased to nearly three times that of white students.183 Further, a study of
office discipline referrals in 364 elementary and middle schools during the
2005–06 school year found that African-American students were more than
two times as likely to be referred to the office for disciplinary issues as
white students.184 The same study found that African-American students
were also four times more likely to be sent to the principal’s office than
white students.185

176. See id. at 230 (quoting from the student handbook).
177. See id. at 235 (“These young men were obliged, while at St. Augustine High
School, to do as they were required by the rules of the school—which they deliberately
chose to ignore.”).
178. Id. at 234.
179. Id. at 235.
180. See Russell J. Skiba et. al, Race is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of
African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCH. REV.
85, 86 (2011) (showing that this has remained the case for over twenty-five years).
181. See id. (“Documentation of disciplinary overrepresentation for African American
students has been highly consistent.”).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 101.
185. Id.
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V. Conclusion

Because of their foci on autonomy and accountability, supporters of
charter schools have argued that they are the perfect vehicle for addressing
the educational needs of students of color. This article points out, however,
that charter schools may not be state actors under federal law with respect
to student rights. Consequently, students of color may be unwittingly
surrendering protections guaranteed under the Constitution in order to
enroll in charter schools.

